Malware analysis is essential to understanding the internal logic and intent of malware programs in order to mitigate their threats. As the analysis methods have evolved, malware authors have adopted more techniques such as the virtualization obfuscation to protect the malware inner workings. This manuscript presents a framework for deobfuscating software, which abstracts the input program as much as a mathematical model of its behavior through monitoring every single operation performed during the malware execution. Also, the program is guided to run through its di erent execution paths automatically in order to gather as much knowledge as possible in the shortest time span. This makes it possible to nd hidden logics and deobfuscate di erent obfuscation techniques without being dependent on their speci c details. The resulting model is recoded as a C program without the arti cially added complexities. This code is called a twincode and behaves in the same manner as the obfuscated binary. As a proof of concept, the proposed framework is implemented and its e ectiveness is evaluated on obfuscated binaries. Program control ow graphs are inspected as a measure of successful code recovery. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated using the set of SPEC test programs.
Introduction
Malware programs have evolved rapidly over the past decade, initially developed for fun, now being tools for nancial pro t and espionage. The new generation of malware, as depicted by the EquationDrug and the GrayFish 1], are constructed from well-developed modules responsible for a variety of duties such as exploitation, C&C communication, rootkit functionality, and so on. For example, the main module of the Flame 2] occupies about 6 MB and integrates all of the noted components together.
Understanding the internal logic of a malware is of great importance in order to defend against it and limit its e ectiveness. For example, knowledge of the Domain Name Generation (DNG) algorithm of a botnet could be used to predict its following command and control domain name; the propagation IP address selection algorithm of a worm indicates its infection strategy and may provide insight into its target goals; and knowledge of vulnerabilities employed by a rootkit make it possible to immune systems to them. Gaining this knowledge is not easy, because malware authors use obfuscation techniques to protect the internal logic of their code. Although initial obfuscation techniques focused on changing the function names or replacing them with multiple functions to create a more complex looking code, as time has passed, much more advanced techniques have been proposed to obfuscate the code not only in its look but also in its logic.
One of the advanced obfuscation techniques currently being used is Virtualization Obfuscation (VO) 3]. VO can be seen as a virtual machine for a dynamically constructed computing architecture instance. In its simplest form, the obfuscator has a single virtual language consisting of a small set of assembly instructions. Given a program in source/binary form, it is (re)compiled to this virtual language. The obfuscator can translate each assembly instruction from the source language (e.g., x86 assembly) to one or more instructions in the target language. Finally, it assigns random opcodes to the target language instructions. This makes the nal binary representation look like pseudorandom bytes. The resulting code is stored in the data section and the executable code is replaced with a dynamically generated interpreter.
Many deobfuscation methods 3-8] depend on speci c aspects of the obfuscator. In the analysis of a VO protected malware, static solutions need to analyze the executable, which is entirely replaced with the VO interpreter code. Therefore, they need to go deep into the data section, distinguish those bytes as data and encoded virtual opcodes, and decipher them into a set of instructions for the used virtual machine. This makes static analysis impractical specially if the VO is combined with other obfuscation techniques such as anti-disassembly and data encryption tricks. Dynamic solutions are also challenging since many aspects of the software runtime behavior such as Control Flow Graph (CFG) and memory/registers access patterns have changed. For example, although a solution, which inspects executed branches to reconstruct the program CFG, obtains a view of the VO interpreter CFG, it misses the higher level CFG, which has been formed among the virtual instructions. This may require the deobfuscator to put more precise assumptions about the VO strategy to focus on the hidden virtual program and the deobfuscator may fail when those VO strategies or used template languages are changed.
There have been two general approaches to deobfuscating the code. Consider an image which has been broken into pieces like a jigsaw puzzle. One approach to solving the puzzle and restoring the image is to examine how each individual piece can t into another piece. For example, the low-level obfuscation patterns 9] are listed in a database and whenever one of them is detected in the obfuscated binary, it is replaced by its corresponding original code. Nevertheless, growing number of possible obfuscation techniques/patterns and dependence on the proper knowledge about each pattern complicate such an approach. An alternative approach is to focus on the major image components (e.g., a cloud in the sky) and try to group puzzle pieces which hold a similar content together. These solutions 10] consider high level characteristics such as the syscalls existence and capture the related instructions (e.g., to prepare syscall arguments). Such methods can be used against new obfuscators to analyze their behavior (e.g., list called syscalls), but they are not useful for learning the internal logic, such as the DNG algorithm of a bot or hidden behavior, e.g., a backdoor which remains inactive until a secret message is received. In other words, like in our puzzle example, those solutions put a number of pieces in the center of the puzzle as they look related to the mountains and put other pieces at the top as they look like the clouds, but they cannot match pieces which are gathered at the top or in the center of the puzzle together. They cannot generate any source code, detect/remove any deadcode, or analyze hidden logics, which may be executed if the malware environment is di erent.
This manuscript proposes a middle approach to the deobfuscation problem. Like in the puzzle example, an alternative approach is to understand what the image is and to slice it to create a new puzzle, which shows the same image but with much simpler pieces. In the context of deobfuscation problem, we mathematically model the malware by capturing its behavior alongside all possible execution paths. Afterwards, the obtained model is used to generate a new code, namely twincode, which is a compilable C program without the initial arti cial complexities of the obfuscated malware and behaves exactly as the original binary. Most importantly, twincode enables an analyst to inspect the functionality of di erent parts of the program by modifying, compiling, and reevaluating it as required.
In the proposed framework, dynamic analysis is employed to instrument the input binary using Pin 11] , tracing all assembly instructions, and monitoring the binary (including changes in registers, memory, and invoked syscalls). Furthermore, to decrease the required resources for a xed degree of deobfuscation, concretesymbolic (concolic 12,13]) execution is employed by which concrete inputs (and required environment conguration) drive the execution through a speci ed path while the executed instructions are also inspected symbolically to nd the input/output relationship for all inputs which could drive the program through the same execution path. As the program becomes more complicated, an open opportunity for understanding the internal code logic is maintained. Understanding the internal logic of a malware such as DNG algorithm of a bot, generation of comprehensive behavioral signatures for categorizing malware in their related families, debugging benign software which are obfuscated, and analysis of close sourced and obfuscated benign software for the presence of concealed backdoor are a few possible use cases of this framework.
The resulting twincode has a CFG similar to that of the original code. It performs the same memory changes as the original code and invokes the same syscalls with the same parameters and mem-ory/registers states. Behavior of complicated operations is captured by symbolic expressions in order to eliminate the e ects of the junk codes. Since twincode is obtained by monitoring and simplifying the program behavior through di erent execution paths, it is e ective against behavior-preserving obfuscations. For example, if an obfuscation transformation adds to program behavior by checking for existence of a le, its corresponding twincode will also check for existence of that le. Twinner framework implementation is open sourced and available to the research community.
The contributions of this manuscript can be summarized as: 1. Proposing an automated deobfuscation framework based on the deep abstraction and recoding approach, keeping deobfuscation independent of known obfuscators; 2. Providing a canonical representation of the deobfuscated code (i.e., twincode), which is a structured C code with the same runtime behavior as the input program, but simpli ed for easier analysis; 3. Evaluating the proposed framework by employing a proof of concept implementation to deobfuscate a series of VO protected binaries. The rest of this manuscript is structured as follows. Section 2 enumerates and brie y explains the related deobfuscation techniques. Section 3 describes the proposed framework. It enumerates key framework elements and reduces the deobfuscation problem into a set of subproblems. Section 4 deals with the implementation details of the proof of concept code, which is used for the practical evaluations in Section 5. Afterwards, Section 6 discusses the remaining challenges and how they can be addressed, and compares the proposed framework and other related works objectively. The manuscript is concluded in Section 7.
Related work
Analysis and deobfuscation solutions can be put in the following general categories. Some methods try to detect obfuscation layers and reverse them one by one. Such solutions 3,5] lead to high quality results but are always a step behind the obfuscators. Alternatively, a number of methods focus on speci c program features which are hard to hide, such as used syscalls. These methods 6, 10] work in the presence of new obfuscation techniques but produce lower quality results. Some frameworks 14, 15] use these approaches to present binary inspection services to higher level analysis algorithms. But, there is also a third middle approach, which is not investigated adequately. It is to try to remove obfuscation e ects by abstracting program features and then, recoding the resulting abstract behavioral model. This approach minimizes the transformation errors since no program portion is ignored during the inspection and simpli cation process and works despite future/unknown obfuscation techniques, because the higher abstraction of the intermediary model captures the core logic of the protected program itself independent of the applied obfuscations. The rest of this section enumerates and brie y compares some of the most notable studies related to the proposed framework.
The Rolles 3] method from the rst category employs symbolic execution to map di erent parts of a VO protected malware onto symbolic functions. It assumes that the VM interpreter is reverse engineered once and the only unknown thing about it is the randomization of its opcodes and/or internal obfuscations of the VM code. It also assumes that it is noti ed when the execution of the VM part starts. The VM parts are converted to symbolic functions and compared with the reverse engineered VM parts using theorem proving techniques. When it nds invoked parts, it replaces them with the reversed codes. This method fails if (a) the malware used VM is instantiated from a di erent family of VMs (with some di erent template language) or (b) the theorem prover cannot nd the equivalent symbolic function of the executed part among reverse engineered parts. Kinder 4] approaches this problem by static analysis. The main issue of the static analysis is domain-attening, in which the analysis of the VO protected malware leads to analysis of the interpreter. Assuming that VM has a decode-dispatch style, there would be some Virtual Program Counter (VPC) indicating the virtual opcode, which should be executed. Assuming that the VPC can be found by some analysis, Kinder resolves the domain-attening issue by creating a separate state per each value of (PC, VPC) pair. This method does not recover any code to allow further analysis of the resulting program, but allows analysis of the malware behavior statically without merging calculated states after each cycle of the decode-dispatch loop.
Yadegari et al. 5] used taint propagation to identify data ows during an execution and then, applied a series of semantics preserving transformations to simplify that logic. For this purpose, they employed Ether to obtain code traces and then, applied ve simpli cation methods to the traces. Finally, they constructed a CFG from the simpli ed traces. This method can work for packers which do not test their environment settings (e.g., execution delay) to conceal their runtime behavior. Peng et al. 16] proposed an algorithm for exploring all possible execution paths of an input program. It forces branch instructions by changing them in memory to follow an intended side.
ROPMEMU 17] focuses on return oriented pro-gramming as an obfuscation technique. It uses dynamic analysis to discover ROP gadgets, chain them to obtain higher level traces by skipping over some of return-tolibrary functions, and then merges gadget contents. It reconstructs CFG diagrams from these gadgets as its deobfuscated output. It also applies standard compiler optimizations in order to remove some redundancies. Methods from the second category resist more complicated obfuscations, but they need to sacri ce their output completeness. The Coogan et al.'s 10] method relaxes the problem from reversing the given code into eliminating as much VM code as possible. It achieves this by inspecting invoked syscalls, checking their arguments, and nding causal dependencies among instructions to nd codes with some in uence on those arguments. The Rotalum e method 6] focuses on reversing the code of the VM itself (instead of the protected code, which is encoded in the data section). For this purpose, it needs to know about the used opcode values (random numbers) and their meaning. It assumes that VM has a decode-dispatch structure in which a big loop over a switch-case statement fetches opcodes and then, jumps to the corresponding part of the VM to emulate that instruction. Accordingly, Rotalum e tries to gure out fetched numbers as opcodes and code parts, which are executed after each fetch as their corresponding functionalities.
Another kind of malware obfuscation, which is worth noting, is using weird machines. Weird machines 18] are used in some unexpected manner. For example, the ELF le metadata can be used as a Turing-complete language to execute the malware while the executable program is not yet loaded 19]. Since our method starts instrumenting the input program before the start of runtime loader, it can watch instructions of runtime loader itself and generate twincode of ELF-metadata weird machine. However, there are weird machines which employ kernel-level codes for their execution. As the kernel code is not instrumented by our method, such machines remain undetectable. For example, a sequence of page fault and double page fault handling procedures can be used as a weird machine 20]. The weird machine executes the malware completely while no single instruction is fetched to be executed yet.
Framework
Even though dynamic analysis is a powerful approach to binary analysis, it has a set of issues which need to be considered. Speci cally, the executed code may be analyzed incompletely due to missing proper inputs to uncover important code portions. Even when the program is executed along an interesting path, it may look too complex since a simple logical operation could be replaced with an obfuscated version. The rst issue Figure 1 . An example code with several obfuscations, e.g., a while loop, which does not stop before an over ow; an unreachable code that calls a complicated function; and some arithmetical obfuscations.
leads to a trade-o between the dynamic code coverage and the used time and memory resources. The second issue can lead, in an extreme case, to analysis of the used packing and/or emulation code instead of the protected code, in uencing the analysis e ectiveness.
In order to better understand the two noted issues, consider the code presented in Figure 1 . For example, all code lines except lines 9-10 are there to hide the main logic of the getsecret function. Each time the program is executed, information about one of its many execution paths is obtained, depending on the values passed to the function as input. Without prior knowledge about the internal logic of the code, it is challenging to distinguish between inputs, which activate important paths or alternatively trigger traps providing no useful analysis results.
Furthermore, after traversing di erent execution paths and identifying deadcodes, important parts of the code may contain further obfuscations. For example, the conditional branch of line 2 guarantees that the key ts in one byte when line 9 is being executed. Thus, lines 9-10 can be simpli ed to return the key itself. Hence, each analyzed execution path should be simpli ed based on the asserted constraints in the collected context in order to remove the pathdependent obfuscations.
In what follows, the twinner framework is presented, which eliminates both syntactical and logical obfuscations by observing the executed binary code during a gray-box instrumented run, modeling its behavior, simplifying the model by abstracting the behavior/logic, and then regenerating the code according to the simpli ed logic. It should be noted that it is di cult to conceal high level program behaviors. For example, a variable may be stored in multiple memory locations to hide existence of a common variable. However, still those addresses have to be used instead of that common variable. Thus, abstracting out the memory addresses used cancels out the e ect of such an obfuscation. In fact, the higher the abstraction level, the easier the transformation to simpli ed logic in practice. Figure 2 shows the proposed framework in which the components/products are shown as rectangles/ellipses. This framework inspects an input obfuscated program iteratively using dynamic analysis. In each iteration, an execution path of the program is analyzed to obtain the relevant information of that part. Meanwhile, the program interacts with its environment, manipulates its memory/registers, and invokes syscalls. A malware can hide its logic in each part. For example, it can move user input through many locations to evade its ultimate usage place or it may obfuscate the memory contents by non-interfering dummy operations such as calculating ( + 1) 2 2 instead of 2 expression.
All such activities are monitored symbolically to aggregate the obtained information and form an abstract behavioral model. Behavior of the program is simpli ed in two phases. First, while capturing each execution trace, several simpli cation rules are applied to the program input-to-output symbolic relationships. Second, while updating the behavioral model based on the simpli ed traces, a theorem proving tool is used to further simplify expressions and constraints as well as to remove possible deadcode branches. The model evolves by each iteration and at the end, a twincode is generated, which has a simpli ed logic but behaves exactly as if it is the original code.
The Concolic Execution Engine (CEE) component, shown at the bottom of Figure 2 , deals with the dynamic analysis challenges, runs the protected binary in an speci c desired path, and reports its symbolic execution results. Figure 2 , in order to nd the required concrete inputs to inspect the next program paths and to simplify the obtained mathematical model. The rest of this section discusses the proposed code behavior modeling approach in Section 3.1. Afterwards, Section 3.2 describes how the obtained model can be simpli ed by abstracting its behavior/logic and Section 3.3 discusses how it can be encoded as a twincode for further analysis. Upon running a program, a series of assembly instructions are executed depending on the program inputs and its environment (e.g., network status). Each one of the followed execution paths covers parts of the program, forming a trace, which indicates a list of events including the satis ed conditions, the changes in the memory/registers contents, and invoked syscalls, all as symbolic expressions. statement s ::= con ned c j illuminated i: (1) Eq. (1) shows two types of statements which can be seen during the execution. Con ned statements are those which are instrumented and their complete behavior can be tracked symbolically. Illuminated statements constitute the sources of uncontrolled randomness, such as invoked system calls. When a con ned statement is executed, it updates the concrete memory state, the symbolic changes of the program, and satis ed constraints. When an illuminated statement is executed, it changes the concrete program state in an uncontrolled way and hence, it can lead to the creation of new symbols. The operational semantics of statements execution is shown in Figure 3 
Path exploration and modeling
The rst rule in Figure 3 The ILLUMINATED-OP rule is invoked after execution of an illuminated statement (i) and when the program state has been updated out of the instrumentation control. The program state (S) needs to be updated as dictated in its corresponding memory initialization function (mI j + 1] : mS where mS = N ! N f?g). As shown in Eq. (3), the new state is formed by overriding the memory cells which have been assigned to a new value by PSS decision. The trace segment index is increased to (j +1) and the new trace segment is appended to the sequence of trace segments (T S j = (C j ; mC j ; SC j )). C j and mC j are symbolic conditions and behavior encodings of the segment, which are accumulated during the execution of trace segment T S j , and SC j = Terminator(i) denotes the terminating operation, which nishes execution of that segment (e.g., invoking the \open" system call). The condition and behavior tracking functions need to be updated for the new trace segment too. For this purpose, a tautology function (>) is assigned as the new condition (C j+1 ) and an identity function (id mS (x) = x for x 2 mS ) is used for initializing the behavior function.
De nition 1 (Trace): The trace T n is a sequence of n trace segments hT S k = (C k ; mC k ; SC k )i n k=1 where the T S k models a section terminated by SC k 2 N. C k : mS ! f?; >g, and mC k : mS ! mS are obtained as shown in the operational semantics in Figure 3 and they denote the conditions which must be satis ed in the program state before execution of T S k in order to guide the execution through the statements of T S k and observe changes of mC k in the program state.
De nition 2 (Guided execution): When a program P is executed according to the operational semantics in Figure 3 and its memory state is overridden at the beginning of each trace segment T S k according to mI : N ! mS, it is said that execution of P is guided by the function mI. This guided execution is shown as E P; mI], which is the set of all possible traces T that can be obtained through the execution. ETG is a graph consisting of all program traces. It is not necessarily a tree, because parts of the ETG can refer (via branches) to its other parts. However, it does not correlate with the obfuscated program CFG, because all branches that are resolved during a trace are simpli ed together. The ETG branches only when there is an input-dependent condition. For example, deobfuscating a VO protected program eliminates all checks on the values of the pseudoopcodes, because inspecting those opcodes always leads to their corresponding implementation in the used virtual machine instance. Instead, the ETG corresponds to the original program CFG. The ETG is eventually encoded as the twincode, as will be discussed later in Section 3.3.
The PSS component is responsible for driving the deobfuscation process to extract information from the input binary iteratively. Pointing to the algorithm sketch in Figure 4 , the PSS starts with an initial execution of the P obfuscated program. This initial trace establishes a single-path ETG to approximate the input program. In each iteration, PSS executes the binary through a new execution path trying to collect a set of traces covering all assembly instructions (static coverage) and all possible branching paths (dynamic coverage). As an example, given that a read register contains a symbol which was checked to be greater than to follow an execution path, PSS can assign a number less than to that symbol in order to guide the program along a new path in the following iteration. This issue is correlated with deadcode (i.e., the parts which cannot be executed with any input) detection challenge. To solve either of the above issues, the PSS needs to know whether there is a set of concrete values for the used symbols to drive the CEE along a speci c path. This problem is equivalent to solving the constraints corresponding to the desired execution path, which is known as Satis ability Modulo Theories (SMT) 21] solving. If an SMT query is proved to be unsatis able, the related code is a deadcode. If a concrete solution can be found, the CEE can be guided through that path.
The SMTS component, at the top of Figure 2 , is designed to respond to SMT queries of PSS. Since SMT solvers are decision procedures, they can terminate eventually. However, deciding that a SMT query is satis able is an NP-complete problem and can be a performance bottleneck in the worst case. To ensure that SMTS terminates in a polynomial time similar to other components of the proposed framework, it is possible to con gure a deadline for solving each SMT query and obtain a concrete solution. In the worst case, when the SMT solver cannot answer within a xed-time deadline, the corresponding branch is left unexplored and marked as possible deadcode. An alternative in the worst-case scenarios is to negate the conditions of non-conforming branches in memory so that the solver can follow the desired side of each branch independent of the used concrete values. However, it can be used by a malware to slow down deobfuscation and delay analysis of other execution paths. The current PoC implementation does not use branch negation to avoid analysis of possible deadcode areas and save the analysis time for other parts.
The search strategy indicates which execution path should be queried thereafter. Putting collected traces together, it builds a conception of the complete ETG, searches within it, and decides where to explore more to construct a more comprehensive model. In other words, in each iteration, the constructed graph approximates the obfuscated binary in more details. An example of the strategy is to perform Depth-First Search (DFS) until an instruction is visited k times (hence, k rounds of an input-dependent loop unfolded). Search strategies and maximizing code coverage are research subjects 22, 23] in the eld of software automated testing. Figure 4 . Sketch of the PSS algorithm using SMTS for solving symbolic constraints and CEE for executing through the intended paths.
Abstraction and simpli cation
As discussed earlier, dynamic analysis approaches need to address two main issues, namely e ectiveness and dynamic coverage. In complex obfuscation scenarios, such as VO, the analysis may follow the logic of the used virtual machine instead of the protected code, making the deobfuscation ine ective (even though technically correct). To overcome the e ectiveness challenge, instead of capturing the executed assembly instructions (like 8]), CEE captures the behavior of each executed instruction in terms of its mathematical formula. Although instructions can be obfuscated, their functionality and hence, the formula modeling how registers and memory addresses are changed by the program execution remain obtainable across all obfuscations. In addition, dynamic coverage makes a trade-o between completeness of analysis and the used time and memory resources. For this tradeo , concolic 12,13] execution is employed in which all instructions are executed normally (therefore, antidisassembly techniques are mitigated automatically) and each instruction is inspected symbolically (therefore, the obtained input/output relationship is not restricted to the environment/concrete inputs).
Another challenge pertains to how to drive the program during the dynamic analysis (under the control of the CEE) along the execution path, which is determined by the PSS (in terms of a set of concrete inputs). For this purpose, the CEE traces all input values as symbols during the concolic execution. Therefore, the CEE has the chance of modifying values of all symbols in the memory and registers before they are read by the program.
De nition 3 (symbol): A symbol SYM = (v; t)
models a value which can be stored at some memory address or register. v is the concrete value represented by SYM in the current execution and t is the type of v (e.g., uint16 t) indicating the set of values which could be used by SYM. De nition 4 (more constrained initialization relation): A memory initialization function mI 0 is said to be \more constrained" than another memory initialization function mI and is denoted by mI b mI 0 if and only if mI 0 is exactly the same as mI, but initializes more memory symbols. It is formally depicted in Eq. (4). 8mI; mI 0 : N ! mS:mI b mI 0 () mI 6 = mI 0^8 j : N:8x 2 N: mI j](x) 6 = ? =) mI j](x) = mI 0 j](x) : (4) An obfuscator can challenge dynamic analysis solutions in two main ways. On the one hand, it can add guard codes to hide the original program at runtime. A notable guard code is the latencychecker by which a time consuming action is performed and its measured time is compared with a threshold. As debugging slows down the execution, the malware can detect such extra latency. In defense, the notion of symbolic inputs can be extended to consider the intermediate memory states. For example, the RDTSC instruction loads the current time-stamp into registers. Although this value is not a user-input, it is not computed by the program either. It is a system-input. The CEE component can mark such inputs and report them back to the PSS. This resolves the guard code problem by asking the PSS component to nd user and system inputs in order to maximize the analysis code coverage.
On the other hand, the computed function can be complicated (e.g., by additional neutral arithmetic); as a result, the observed functionality of the program remains incomprehensible. To address this issue, the calculated symbolic expression is simpli ed as it is gathered by the instruction analysis routines based on a set of expression simpli cation rules. Some of these rules are listed in Table 1 . For the complete list, the Operator subclasses from the exptoken namespace in the Twinner git repository can be inspected. For example, the rst row of Table 1 states that the bitwise AND of a symbol with jSj bits and some bitmask, which is zero in its lowest jSj bits, removes the symbol S. Theorem 1 (repeatability): Given a program P and one of its traces T n = hT S k = (C k ; mC k ; SC k )i n k=1 , which has been acquired through an execution E P; mI] for some memory initialization function mI, either repeating the execution E P; mI] always produces the same trace or there exists a more constrained memory initialization function mI : N ! mS that always produces the same execution trace, as depicted in Eq. (5): 8P; mI:8T n : E P; mI]:9mI : N ! mS:
(mI = mI _ mI b mI ) jE P; mI ]j = 1^T n 2 E P; mI ] : (5) Proof. Repeating the execution E P; mI] (using mI = mI ), a trace such as T m = hT S k = (C k ; mC k ; SC k )i m k=1 is produced. If we can prove equality of this arbitrary trace with the target trace of the theorem (T m = T n ), it is proved that no other trace will be produced during that guided execution 
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and hence, jE P; mI ]j = 1 which completes the proof. For this purpose, it is enough to show that n = jT n j = jT m j = m and (C k ; mC k ; SC k ) = (C k ; mC k ; SC k ) for 1 k n. Also, in scenarios that this equality cannot be proved, E P; mI ] can be changed by adding more constraints to mI in order to maintain the equality of traces while the equation mI b mI is not violated. In these scenarios, the second form of the target proposition (Eq. (6)) is proved.
(mI b mI )^jE P; mI ]j=1^T n 2 E P; mI ] : (6) In both traces, execution of P is initiated by the same statement; thus, the initial states of T S 1 and T S 1 trace segments are the same. If we can prove that this equality is maintained during the execution of the rst trace segment and the same sequence of statements is executed in both runs, the nal system call of both segments will be the same (since it is the last statement obtained during the execution of the rst segment) and it observes the same concrete state of P (because the equality has been preserved during the execution of that trace segment). This ensures that either both traces will terminate or both will continue execution from the second trace segment. However, the possible di erences in the kernel state can make the initial concrete states of the following two trace segments di erent.
By induction, we prove that if the rst q trace segments are equal (hT S k i q k=1 = hT S k i q k=1 ), the q + 1th trace segments (T S q+1 and T S q+1 ), which have to start with the same statements but di erent concrete states, can be made equal only by adding more constraints to mI while maintaining the equation mI b mI . This completes the proof by showing that n = m, because no trace can be terminated earlier when the concrete states of both are the same at the time of invoking the same system calls. For this proof, we should note that the rst statement of T S q+1 and S 0 q+1 = S q+1 mI q + 1] SC q = Terminator(i) T S q = (C q ; mC q ; SC q ) s = Next(S 0 q+1 ; i) S q+1 ; q; hT S k i q 1 k=1 ; C q ; mC q ; mI; i S 0 q+1 ; q + 1; hT S k i q k=1 ; >; id mS ; mI; s ILLUMINATED-OP: (7) Box I T S q+1 is an illuminated statement i, which is seen after return of the SC q = SC q , while the concrete states of the two runs (see Figure 3 ) can di er (S q+1 6 = S q+1 ) before executing i itself. However, after execution of i, all following statements should be con ned, because the rst following illuminated statement will terminate the trace segment. Execution of the rst illuminated statement uses the operation rule of Eq. (7) shown in Box I.
The set of possible di erence points between two functions u; v : N ! N can be obtained by Eq. (8):
The possible di erence points of the initial program states (S q+1 S q+1 ) can either be overridden by mI q+ 1] during execution of i (in which case it is not required to update mI ) or will remain di erent in some cases between two sets ((S q+1 S q+1 ) fx 2 NjmI q+1](x) 6 = ?g). In this case, the concrete states can be made equal by updating mI q + 1] according to Eq. (9) shown in Box II. This ensures that S 0 q+1 = S 0 q+1 . Because this reasoning is made about an arbitrary member of the new guided execution set (T m 2 E P; mI ]), it shows that from any initial di erence set such as (S q+1 S q+1 ), an appropriate patch can be constructed for updating mI q + 1] and consequently equating trace segments T S q+1 and T S q+1 . However, for constructing mI q + 1] in practice, there are two approaches. One approach is to override all memory cells which were not overridden by the rst memory initialization vector, as shown in Eq. (10): mI q + 1] = S q+1 mI q + 1]: (10) Another approach is to repeat the execution iteratively, once running E P; mI (1) ], where mI (1) = mI, in order to obtain di erence sets and produce mI (2) for overriding those di erences and then, running E P; mI (2) ] to obtain mI (3) and so on. Since more cells are initialized in each turn, the initialization vector becomes more constrained (mI (1) b mI (2) b ::: b mI ) and the guided execution set will converge to a single-member set.
Since concrete program states are made equal, the next executing statements in both trace segments will also be the same (s = Next(S 0 q+1 ; i) = Next(S 0 q+1 ; i)).
In addition, the initial constraints and behavior functions are initialized with the same value (>; id mS ).
Execution of the next con ned statement c is performed by the operation rule of Eq. (11), shown in Box III. Because both trace segments are running the same c statement, their condition/behavior functions will also be the same (f = f and c = c ). Furthermore, since S q+1 = S q+1 before execution of c, the following concrete states will also be the same (f(S q+1 ) = f (S q+1 )). Similarly, the updated condition (Eq. (12)) and behavior (Eq. (13)) functions will be equal. Finally, equality of the following concrete states (f(S q+1 ) = f (S q+1 )) leads to execution of the same following statements (s = Next(f(S q+1 ); c) = Next(f (S q+1 ); c)). C q+1^c 0 =C q+1^( c mC q+1 ) =C q+1^( c mC q+1 ) = C q+1^c 0 ; (12) mI q + 1](x) = 8 > < > : 
Box III f mC q+1 = f mC q+1 : (13) Repeating this reasoning for every following conned statement c, the concrete and symbolic program states will remain equal in both trace segments until execution of the next illuminated statement i, which terminates the trace segment.
Theorem 1 states that all programs are deterministic. That is, without interacting with the outside world (e.g., an OS syscall), a program has no inherent source of randomness which is not marked as a symbolic input. In other words, since all instructions, which can provide some inputs to the program (e.g., syscalls or hardware timers), are instrumented, those inputs can be modi ed by CEE before being used for the rst time. For example, opening a le may succeed/fail at di erent times, but even if a le is deleted, the malware can be made to believe that the le is present by feeding the le data stream to the malware through memory modi cations. Ensuring that the environment is not changed at all (or the malware cannot sense those changes), re-executing it leads to the same results all the times.
Twincode generation
Completing the introduced chain of components of the proposed framework, this section explains how the twincode is generated as the ultimate result. Twincode is structured as the ETG, encoding the same conditions of the analyzed program, preparing memory/registers contents as a function of their previous states, and invoking the same syscalls. Consequently, it behaves like the obfuscated program with the di erence that its functionality is simpli ed and visible in the C code. Thus, it can be used as input to other analysis techniques and/or manual inspection. Each trace represents the program behavior during an execution path. Therefore, if all execution paths of the input program are determined, their corresponding traces can be mined out and putting those traces together, the nal twincode can be generated.
De nition 5 (twincode of a program): The twincode of the program P, shown as (P), is an encoding of its ETG as shown in Figure 5 . The algorithm in Figure 5 starts with the ETG root node and visits its nodes as follows. Visiting a node such as u, which is connected to n other nodes, an if-else construct is outputted having an if part for each one of the n connected nodes. Upon visiting a segment terminator node, the symbolic changes of that part are simpli ed using SMTS and outputted; the syscall invocation code for its corresponding syscall is outputted afterwards; register/memory symbols of the next segment are instantiated and initialized with concrete register/memory values at that time instant; and the segment identi er is incremented. Upon Figure 5 . Sketch of the twincode encoding algorithm.
visiting a previously encoded ETG node, its previous encoding is reused by moving its corresponding code to a separate function.
As the program is analyzed more in each iteration, its new parts are discovered and its ETG is evolved. Thus, any realization of the PSS must be able to perform the search incrementally. Another feature of the twincode is that, starting from di erent obfuscated versions of a program, similar twincodes are produced. In other words, twincodes of all obfuscated versions will contain traces which can be obtained from the original program. This allows the twincode to be analyzed instead of a speci c obfuscated version.
De nition 6 (equivalent programs): Two programs P and P are equivalent, shown as P P , if and only if they behave equivalently for all possible memory initializations (inputs), as depicted in Eq. (14). 8P; P :P P () 8mI : N ! mS:E P; mI]=E P ; mI]: (14) (15) Proof. In order to prove the target proposition ( (O P ) (O P ) P) based on the given assumption (O P O P P), we can use the proof by contradiction technique. In other words, we should start by assuming that Eq. (16) holds and show that it leads to a contradiction. O P O P P]^ ( (O P ) 6 P) _ (O P ) 6 P]: (16) Without loss of generality, assume that (O P ) 6 P holds (the same reasoning can be used about the case of (O P ) 6 P). Note Eqs. (17) to (22) shown in Box IV.
Alternatively, in Eq. (19), it is possible to say:
9T P x] m 2 E P; mI]:8T (OP) x] n 2 E (O P ); mI]:
However, due to their symmetry, we use the rst case without loss of generality. Thus, the opposite assumption of Eq. (17) leads to O P 6 P in Eq. (22), which is in contradiction with the assumption of O P P.
Providing better, faster, and more optimized search strategies and/or SMT solvers, as presented in 24], automatically provides a better twincode generator. This is a notable contribution, which allows the research line of software deobfuscation to directly bene t from progress in the software automated testing and SMT solving elds. Any SMT solver can be tted in this framework a ecting the analysis performance, but not its correctness or completeness. The following section explains the details of the implementation and the related practical concerns.
Implementation
This section discusses how the implementation has been carried out and enumerates some of the major practical challenges which should be resolved in the process. It is noteworthy that the proposed framework has been implemented in C++ and consists of more than 35 thousand lines of code. Furthermore, the code is released under GPLv3 through the project page in 25]. Figure 6 depicts the component diagram of this reference implementation. The PSS is realized by the twinner component. It provides a command line interface to con gure the deobfuscation parameters and uses DFS as its search strategy. In each analysis round, it forks a new process to execute the CEE; extracts a trace information including a sequence of satis ed constraints; and updates the ETG accordingly. Although the DFS works over an evolving graph, it does not miss any part since the graph can be ordered unambiguously. ETG nodes contain constraints and are ordered in such a way that all constraints observed in the former traces are placed on the left of those which are seen afterwards. .section .rodata 2 .LC0: 3 .string "overflow\n" 4 .LC1: 5 .string "underflow\n" 6 .LC2: 7 .string "%d\n" 8 .text 9 main: The CEE is realized by twintool, which is implemented within the ldmbl 26] architecture. The ldmbl architecture abstracts low-level OS and hardware-dependent implementation details based on the Pin 11] Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) framework in order to facilitate heavyweight instrumentation use cases such as concolic execution. Twintool is responsible for extracting a single trace from the given binary. It runs the input program concolically, instrumenting all assembly instructions, tracking memory, and register changes symbolically. This gray-box approach has the advantage that the intermediate conditions which have been inspected by the binary will become visible to twintool and can be recorded in the trace without any dependence on extra information, such as a speci c compiler or the source code, which is normally unavailable during the malware analysis. The intel64 assembly instructions are represented by 1148 di erent mnemonics, each one having several modes for di erent operands. For example, the SUB mnemonic encodes 22 distinguished forms 27, p. 1459] such as SUB AX, imm16 and SUB r/m8, r8. Deobfuscating a program needs all of the used forms of its assembly instructions to be supported in the twintool. To make it scalable, twintool implements a Generic Instrumentation Layer (GIL) as designed in the ldmbl 26] architecture. It automatically detects operand types (e.g., memory address) and their read/write sizes; organizes them within 40 generic categories (e.g., DstRegSrcImplicit); and instruments them using a set of Generic Analysis Routines (GARs). Thereafter, every invoked GAR nds the appropriate instruction analysis callback; wraps operands with proxy objects hiding di erent operand types/sizes; and invokes the callback to operate on them.
There are three proxy classes for memory, register, and constant values. Each one allows reading and writing (on mutable expressions), taking care of separation of pintool and input program memory, operation sizes, and overlapping locations. For example, the RegisterResidentExpressionValueProxy class updates EAX, AX, AH, and AL registers when an instruction updates the RAX register. This allows each instruction analysis routine to focus on its own speci c logic while the GIL applies it to a bunch of lower-level assembly instruction models. Figure 8 shows implementation of the ADD instruction analysis routine. It reads immutable/mutable source/destination expressions from proxy objects at lines 4 and 6, clones the destination expression at line 7, performs symbolic addition at line 9, and updates the destination (memory or register) using the proxy object at line 10. The abstraction provided by the twintool library makes it more extensible and easier to support new assembly instructions. For example, whenever an address is accessed for the rst time, a new symbol is allocated for it. If an ADD instruction uses a new user input as its source operand, line 4 of Figure 8 allocates the new symbol for it. Afterwards, symbols may be copied to other addresses and/or undergo di erent operations (e.g., addition and multiplication). When symbols are created, some concrete values exist in them. Those initial values form the concrete state of the program and dictate which execution path will be followed within its running instance. Consequently, the program can be forced to follow another path by changing initial values of the symbols. Finally, line 11 updates the EFLAGS register with an AdditionOpera-tionGroup object, which can be queried in the following conditional instructions, e.g., conditional branches.
The last component of the framework (i.e., the SMTS) is realized using the CVC4 28] library for solving symbolic constraints. It accepts a set of symbolic constraints and produces one of the three possible answers. It analyzes constraints to nd a concrete solution satisfying all of them, simultaneously. If constraints are unsatis able, the CVC4 library either proves this fact or fails after a maximum analysis time. Several challenges arise here. First, the constraints which twintool has extracted from the binary may depend on the real inputs to the program and/or arti cially added parts such as the VM interpreter code in a VO scenario or the decryptor/decompresser code for a packed malware. Next, these symbolic constraints may become more and more complicated; as a result, keeping them in the memory becomes a challenge. This makes solving of those constraints time consuming or infeasible within the given time limits.
Addressing these challenges requires more knowledge about the program inputs and how they a ect the execution path. The rst input category is user inputs, which are given as initial values to the program, and the second category is system inputs (including syscalls), which may depend on states which are hidden from the malware. User inputs (i.e., command line arguments of the program and environment variables) are placed in the stack and can be read by the program. Consequently, they change the execution path either (a) explicitly, via conditional branches (e.g., je .L2); or (b) implicitly, via calculated values (e.g., movq -16(%rbp), %rax; jmp %rax). The next in uencing factor (i.e., syscalls) depends on the OS. This includes reading from a le, network communication, or even reading from the standard input. A typical syscall receives some arguments from the caller program (e.g., a bu er given to \read(fd, buf, len)") and completes its logic according to the given arguments and other parts of its memory (state of the caller process, in general, such as the open \fd" le descriptor) as well as the internal state of the kernel itself (e.g., the mounted le systems). Finally, syscall may change any parts of the caller's memory and/or registers.
On the one hand, the user and system inputs are captured as symbols. On the other hand, obfuscator related data items such as arti cial arithmetic operations are treated as constants. For example, the virtual opcodes which encode the text section of the malware are the same in all executions. Although the execution path depends on both the virtual opcodes and the program inputs, the opcodes may not be changed based on the user interactions or the network and le system states. Consequently, simplifying constraints and transformation expressions based on the symbols is enough to automatically remove any dependence on those obfuscator related details.
Another example is shown in Figure 7 This will not help the obfuscator to initialize it as a function of user inputs and then, cancel their e ects in the comparison of line 32, because simpli cation of the constraints can simplify and remove the arti cial dependency. A more concerning challenge is how these obfuscations a ect the memory used for keeping transformations and constraint symbolic expressions.
As an example, consider lines 28-33 in Figure 7 (a), in which the value of %eax register, e.g., symbolic input s, is added to itself repeatedly to produce s+s, s+s+s+s, etc. growing the required memory exponentially. To overcome this challenge, twintool simpli es symbolic expressions as they are captured, instead of keeping them up to the end of execution to be processed in SMTS. Thus, the expression is kept as 2s, 4s, etc. with constant memory footprint. The twincode generated by the described assembly code is shown in Figure 7 
Evaluation
This section evaluates Twinner from the practical point of view. For this purpose, Twinner is tested against the VO technique to observe the practical quality of the deobfuscation results. The VO replaces the entire text section of the program with an interpreter and it contains the classic obfuscations. That is, evaluation of the VO-protection scenario subsumes the deobfuscation of classical methods such as packing and encryption. Additionally, the set of SPEC 29] test programs is instrumented to examine the performance of a trace extraction run for large and complex realworld programs.
E ectiveness
To measure the similarity of the original program and the deobfuscated twincode, we can compare their ETGs. The structure of ETG is preserved while being encoded as a twincode. ETG is an appropriate metric, because it encodes the behavioral model which has been learned by analysis of the given binary. It also corresponds with the CFG of its twincode counterpart while CFG of the original program can be altered and replaced completely by obfuscation transformations. VO is one of the most complicated methods for obfuscating an arbitrary program. In this technique, a random instance of a template language is selected; the program is compiled to it and placed in the data section; and the entire text section is replaced by a virtual machine interpretor generated to be able to parse that random template language instance. Thus, CFG of the obfuscated program is completely independent of the original program and it can be examined as a di cult test scenario. If the CFG of the original program can be recovered in the structure of the resulting twincode, which can be seen as the resulting ETG, it shows that obfuscation e ect has been cancelled.
In this section, we will VO-protect 4 programs with a variety of CFGs as the rst step to obtain similarly incomprehensible and indistinguishable binaries, which only di er in the pseudorandom data sections. Afterwards, VO-protected programs are reversed and deobfuscated to obtain their execution trace graphs. Finally, similarity of ETGs of the deobfuscated programs and the corresponding original programs is measured according to De nition 7 in order to quantify e ectiveness of the Twinner deobfuscation process.
De nition 7 (ETG similarity): Similarity of two
ETG instances, shown as g 1 = (V 1 ; E 1 ) and g 2 = (V 2 ; E 2 ) graphs, where jV 1 j jV 2 j, is given by g1;g2 and de ned as follows:
the set of H graphs which have an induced subgraph H V h ] being the isomorph of the given G graph; S g1;g2 = S g1 \ S g2 is the set of all graphs which have some induced subgraphs being the isomorph of the given g 1 and g 2 ; Ŝ g1;g2 = (V ;Ê) 2 S g1;g2^8 G = (V G ; E G ) 2 S g1;g2 :jV G j jV j indicates the supremum graph of the g 1 and g 2 graphs, which is a member of S g1;g2 set and has the minimum number of vertices among all members of the set;
The similarity of the g 1 and g 2 graphs is de ned as g1;g2 = 1 jV j jV1j jV j while g1;g2 = 1 shows identical graphs and g1;g2 = 0 shows the minimum normalized similarity among them. Reads an argument and calls exit syscall on it. 0x01
Reads two args and a comparison code, applies one of six comparison operators on them to select between then/else parts, reads two jump o sets and use one of them to execute the then/else part of the conditional block. 0x02
Reads a format string and calls printf on it. 0x03
Reads an o set and jumps to it unconditionally. 0x04
Reads two pointer args, compares their corresponding C strings by calling strcmp, and stores the result in the aux variable.
The test input programs have no speci c importance. It is only required to select programs with di erent behaviors to clearly show how much the VOprotection eliminates their di erences and how much the ETG restores those eliminated features. Figure 9 shows the CFGs of the selected four input programs. The rst program, depicted in Figure 9 (a), has 9 parallel execution paths. The rst path is run when the input arguments are not well-formed. The other 8 paths are selected based on the three code characters in the program argument and an appropriate message is printed in each path. The next program, depicted in Figure 9 (b), has two main execution paths one of which consists of 2 consecutive conditional blocks. This test can be used to examine how the repeated code sequences of the second conditional block are reused during the analysis of di erent paths of the rst conditional block. The P2 program, shown in Figure 9 (c), has a main execution path with three exceptional branches. Finally, Figure 9 (d) depicts the P3 program with a mix of exceptional branches and consecutive merging paths.
The next step of evaluation is to obtain two arti-facts from each given input test program. One of them is a VO-protected binary, which can be used as the input to the deobfuscation process. The other artifact is the ETG of the given test program without any obfuscation. This initial ETG can be compared with the result of the deobfuscation process to determine how much the deobfuscation e ect has been removed successfully. To VO-protect each one of the test programs, they are compiled for a virtual language with 5 primitive opcodes. The interpreter of this language is shown in Figure 10 (a) and its virtual opcodes are described in Table 2 . The program itself is encoded in the program text, followed by the ptr variable at runtime. In an in nite loop containing a switch-case, ptr is inspected to select one of the virtual opcodes and perform the corresponding conditional/unconditional jumps, printing operation, etc. The CFG of the resulting VO-protected code is shown in Figure 10(b) , which is clearly independent of the initial programs. The top node in Figure 10 (b) corresponds to the beginning of interpreter, which calls the switch (line 19 in Figure 10(a) ). The second node of CFG can jump to ve destinations, which correspond 1 int aux; // for intermediate values such as ret value 2 3 int end_of_execution(const char * &ptr); 4 void printf_command(const char * &ptr); 5 void strcmp_command (const char * &ptr); 6 void jump_command(const char * &ptr); 7 void if_then_else_command(const char * &ptr); 8 bool do_comparison(const char * &ptr, int arg0, int arg1); 9 int get_argument(const char * &ptr); 10 const char * init_program(int * argcptr, char * argv[]); to ve virtual opcodes. The rst destination on the right belongs to end of execution opcode and hence, halts the interpreter. The second destination on the right in Figure 10 (b) corresponds to if then else virtual opcode, which reads ve arguments (two operands to be compared, a comparison code to determine the comparison operator, and two o sets for then/else parts of the conditional jump). The following two nodes correspond to the printf and unconditional jump, respectively, which call printf high-level function and change the ptr variable according to the jump o set. The last node corresponds to the strcmp function, which reads two pointer arguments, compares the two strings that are found at the given addresses, and stores the result of the comparison in the aux variable for the next checks. This aux variable can be accessed as an encoded argument by the following virtual operations. The four nodes corresponding to the last four cases of the switch statement merge into the bottom-most node in Figure 10 (b) and jump back to the loop header node. Afterwards, they continue with interpretation of the next virtual operation.
All programs are mapped onto exactly the same interpreter with the same CFG and the di erence between four given programs is limited to the contents of the program text string. This makes all obfuscated binaries syntactically the same, while their di erent runtime behaviors are preserved. Now, there are two binaries for each test program; one without any protection and one with VO-protection. Analyzing them by Twinner to obtain their corresponding twincode and ETG leads to a pair of graphs for each program. Figure 11 shows ETG of the given input binaries and their corresponding deobfuscated versions are depicted in Figure 12 . Comparing Figure 11 (a)-(d) with their counterparts in Figure 12 (a)-(d) side by side, it is clear that each ETG is fully recovered.
For example, consider the ETG of the obfuscated version of P1 program, which is depicted in Figure 12(b) , and its corresponding pre-obfuscation ETG, which is shown in Figure 11 (b). Both graphs consist of three main parts. The rst part, which branches from the main execution path on the right side of gure, checks for the correct number of arguments. This part corresponds to the left-most path in Figure 9 (b). The second part branches into three scenarios and prints the \ rst-else-part " message in two scenarios and the \ rst-then-part " in the last scenario. All the three paths are correctly merged before reaching the last part of the program. These three branching scenarios correspond to the two expressions of which the logical conjunction has been checked as shown in the topright side of Figure 9 (b). The third part prints two then/else-part messages, merges similar to the bottomright side of Figure 9 (b), and then, joins the rst part (for checking arguments). Comparing the output ETG in Figure 12 (b) with the input ETG in Figure 11 FunctionInvocation (calling-line=regs.rax = puts (/*"left option is missing!"*/ (const char *) 0x4007db);)
FunctionInvocation (calling-line=regs.rax = puts (/*"sum of two numbers is more than 15"*/ (const char *) 0x400878);) signExtend_0x80_0x8 (n_v_argv_4_0) > UINT128 (0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2f) FunctionInvocation (calling-line=regs.rax = puts (/*"invalid right value!"*/ (const char *) 0x400828);) signExtend_0x80_0x8 (n_v_argv_4_0) <= UINT128 (0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2f) signExtend_0x80_0x20 ((((signExtend_0x20_0x8 (n_v_argv_4_0) -0x30) + (signExtend_0x20_0x8 (n_v_argv_2_0) -0x30)) & 0xffffffff)) <= UINT128 (0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xf) signExtend_0x80_0x20 ((((signExtend_0x20_0x8 (n_v_argv_4_0) -0x30) + (signExtend_0x20_0x8 (n_v_argv_2_0) -0x30)) & 0xffffffff)) > UINT128 (0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xf) (d) P3 ETG Figure 11 . Execution trace graphs of input binaries before obfuscating them.
duced, which can be used for further analysis. for the valid option value. The CFG of this code is depicted in Figure 13(b) , which corresponds to its ETG shown in Figure 12 (c). Looking at the CFG in Figure 13 Figure 13 . Sample twincode and its corresponding CFG. three arguments, the right-most path of CFG will be followed, which leads to the execution of line 36 and printing the program usage message. Otherwise, the second node, which corresponds to the operations of lines 15-20, will be invoked. This portion compares argv 1] with the hard-coded string of \--option" (the concrete value of argv 1] is also given in the comment as a hint). If the name of a wrong option has been used, the left-most path of CFG will be followed and hence, line 21 prints the corresponding error message. The last condition, which is located at the center of Figure 13 (b), corresponds to the check in lines 23-26, comparing argv 2] with the \optvalue" string and selecting one between line 28 (error case, right branch in CFG) and line 30 (target case, left branch in CFG) to execute. Except for the arrangement of nodes, the CFG in Figure 13 (b) has a main execution path (in which all conditions are evaluated to be true) from which three exceptional paths deviate, similar to the original CFG of P2 depicted in Figure 9 (c).
The input/output ETGs can be compared pairwise according to De nition 7 in order to assign a similarity measure to each pair. Table 3 aggregates these calculated similarities. The diagonal entries in Table 3 are all relatively higher than non-diagonal entries. The diagonal entries with values close to one indicate high restoration of the initial ETG gures. Also, the similarity of unmatched graphs is reduced quickly as each graph becomes more complicated. For small programs, pre/post-obfuscation graphs are separated by the similarity value of 0.7. For larger programs, the similarity drops to below 0.5 while all diagonal entries stay higher than the similarity value of 0.88.
As this proof of concept implementation can be extended to analyze any other application only by supporting its possibly di erent assembly instructions for recognizing and formulating the calculated symbolic expressions, it can be deduced that VO can be automatically reversed on other protected programs similar to the mentioned example. It is worthy to note that this framework does not make any assumptions about the structure of the used virtual machine to produce the twincode. For example, the VM can eliminate the ptr (i.e., VPC) and connect di erent pieces of the virtualized program directly together (e.g., similar to what is done in the jump oriented programming 30]) without causing any change in its corresponding twincode. The generated twincode can be used in static analysis instead of the obfuscated code to directly obtain results about the original program. For example, the CFG in Figure 13 (b) is drawn by static analysis of the corresponding code in Figure 13 (a) using the LLV M 31] -dot-cfg pass.
Performance
In order to measure the execution time overhead of the twintool analysis runs, a set of complicated programs is selected based on the SPEC cpu test to obtain a real-world estimate of the average implied overhead. Latest versions of these programs, which are released for the Ubuntu server 14.04, are used for performance tests. The used evaluation scripts and program inputs are available on the evaluation branch of the Twinner git repository. Moreover, all experiments have been executed in di erent scenarios including a noninstrumented run for native programs, an instrumented run with instruction counting analysis routines (to nd out about the minimum possible instrumentation overhead), and a run with twintool instrumentation to observe the relative overheads.
Experiments were performed on a single-core QEMU/KVM virtual machine with 8GB RAM running Ubuntu server 14.04 with kernel 3.19.0-25-generic x86 64 hosted on a quad-core Intel i7-6700HQ machine. Each experiment scenario has been repeated as many times as required according to the central limit theorem 32] in order to limit the maximum error of the reported mean execution time to at most 0.5% with con dence level of 95%.
The obtained results are aggregated in Table 4 of which the second column reports the native execution time, the third and fourth columns indicate the baseline overhead caused by using the Pin dynamic binary instrumentation framework, and the last two columns indicate the overhead caused by the twintool itself. As indicated in the fourth and sixth columns of Table 4 , the Pin framework slows down the overall execution time by an order of thousand times, but the twintooladded overhead (relative to the instruction counting instrumentation) stays relatively small even for very complicated programs such as the gcc.
Discussion
Given the evaluation results in the previous section, in the following, the possible deobfuscation challenges are discussed; how they are mitigated in the Twinner framework is expressed; and an objective comparison with previous works is presented.
One of the hardest scenarios for SMTS is an opaque predicate (i.e., an always true/false condition), which is so complicated that SMTS cannot reason about its negated constraint within a short time span. For always-true constraints, the logic of the code is captured in the rst trace containing it. Also, its negated constraint is assumed to be unsatis able, which is the case. For always-false constraints, the code is never executed and the SMTS cannot nd any concrete input to drive the program through it. Thus, this path is assumed to be deadcode, which is the case as well. However, when SMTS cannot nd an answer for the queried constraints (such as a oneway hashing function) within the provided deadline, the corresponding path is marked as deadcode and remains unexplored. Although it is possible to enforce the execution through that possible deadcode by temporarily modifying the program assembly instructions in the memory, this makes the concrete state of the program invalid and increases the number of paths to be analyzed. One strategy, which can be inspected in the future research, is to prioritize the execution paths, giving lower priority to the suspected paths and allocating available resources for their analysis according to their priorities. This may lead to a more balanced answer for the trade-o between full analysis of all possible branches and minimizing the analysis time for reachable code paths.
Nevertheless, the current approach to focusing on the constraints, which are solvable within the given time limits as described in the following example, is applicable to most practical scenarios. Consider a bot which tries to retrieve a command from its C&C server and perform the corresponding order (e.g., a denial of service attack). The bot may download new code modules and execute them. In that case, the executed code is not available at the analysis time, i.e., before contacting a real C&C server. But, for command codes which lead to execution of existing malware modules, it is possible to extract, analyze, and generate the corresponding twincode only by communicating with an arbitrary network server, not necessarily the real C&C server. This is in contrast to methods such as 33] that analyze a real tra c trace for modeling and simulating the C&C server for the bot.
The bot program needs cooperation of the OS for receiving the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) from the corresponding socket (e.g., using \recv" function). When control returns to the user-space, the bot can be noti ed about syscall operations by reading its own memory (e.g., the bu er passed to \recv") and/or looking at registers (e.g., the return value depicting the number of read bytes). By instrumenting all assembly instructions (including those which are generated dynamically by the malware), it is possible to preempt when an address is read for the rst time. Instantiated symbols can be written at other addresses (copied) or undergo arithmetical (e.g., addq $4, -16(%rbp)) and logical operations (e.g., cmpl $0, -4(%rbp)) while their expected concrete values are being inspected by every operation. At each memory address or register, a symbolic formula is being kept in addition to its normal concrete value. When all executed instructions are instrumented, the acquired symbolic expressions for all addresses have to match with their concrete values. However, syscall, executed in the kernel-space, is out of the instrumentation scope. Therefore, concrete/symbolic values can mismatch af-ter a syscall. When this occurs (e.g., contents of a le are read in a bu er), new symbols are required to capture the changed concrete values. Thus, all bytes of the bot-C&C communication PDU are controlled by symbols and can be manipulated by twintool at symbol instantiation time.
For example, an arbitrary network server sends command code 0xB to the bot. The bot checks the code and terminates, because it expects a 4 bytes long PDU. This constraint is captured by twintool symbolically and solved to obtain a four bytes long input for use in the next analysis round. Then, the network server sends the 0xB code again, but the bu er is modi ed by twintool on the y to be seen as the calculated four bytes value. The bot continues execution and tries to invoke a function based on the read code. Although the network server program does not know about the format of the message, which is expected by the bot, twintool can automatically deduce it from the program itself iteratively. Possible calling targets can be determined similarly.
Another notable challenge is the high number of assembly instructions and how they can be instrumented correctly and e ciently. For this purpose, the ldmbl 26] architecture is used, which abstracts the APIs provided by Pin 11] in two layers. In one layer (GIL), it minimizes the instrumentation calls and in another layer (GARL), it minimizes the number of required analysis routines through a series of proxy classes. These abstractions help twintool to be implemented in fewer lines of code while maintaining its e ciency as evaluated in Section 5.2. Pin Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) framework uses a Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation mechanism internally for transferring visited instructions to a code cache region before execution, Therefore, the instructions cannot a ect the instrumentation without being monitored by some prior instrumentation. Consequently, di erent obfuscations of a program cannot a ect the instrumentation except by exploiting some vulnerability in the instrumentation framework. Although it is impossible to guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities in Pin DBI framework, like other software/hardware components, such a vulnerability (if any) should be addressed in the underlying DBI framework and it is out of the adversarial model of twintool. Table 5 summarizes a comparison of the mentioned related studies and the Twinner framework.
Each cell is marked with p if the solution mentioned in the respective row is able to outperform the obfuscation technique noted in its column. If it cannot reverse the transformation, the cell is marked with . On the other hand, if it cannot be reversed completely, but it is partially considered in the solution, the mark is used. The mark indicates that the mentioned feature is inapplicable to the solution. Table 5 . Comparison of analysis and deobfuscation solutions. p shows that the mentioned solution can overcome the Twinner, X-Force [16] , and Kinder [4] , to the benign code portions due to the lack of a code coverage maximization strategy.
Conclusion
This manuscript presented a framework for software deobfuscation, namely Twinner, which could dynamically analyze an arbitrary Windows/Linux executable program. The presented framework mapped the deobfuscation problem onto three components. The rst component was a Concolic Execution Engine (CEE), which instrumented the given binary and captured its runtime behavior in a series of symbolic expressions and constraints. The second one was a Path Search Strategy (PSS), which learnt a behavioral model of the program by running it through di erent execution paths iteratively. In each run, an independent instance of CEE was employed to run the binary along a speci c path and produce its corresponding trace object. The third component was a library for solving symbolic constraints (SMTS) used by PSS to nd out candidate concrete values for symbols in order to guide CEE runs along the following unexplored paths.
Also, a proof of concept implementation of the proposed framework was presented and evaluated to measure the deobfuscation e ectiveness and performance using di erent real-world programs. The proposed method was not dependent on any obfuscation process or structure of the obfuscated program. CEE, which was realized as twintool library, was implemented using the ldmbl architecture based on the Intel Pin. By instrumenting assembly instructions, it found out about memory symbols before their rst use and hence, it could guide the program along a speci c execution path by modifying their concrete values. PSS, which was realized as twinner, provided a command line interface for con guring the deobfuscation parameters and combined the traces received from twintool to update an Execution Trace Graph (ETG). In each round, the twinner selected the next execution path by DFS searching the ETG and obtained a list of constraints for satisfying all branches along the selected path. The CVC4 SMT solver was used to nd a concrete solution to those constraints and feed the twintool.
As the code was analyzed concolically along all paths, anti-debugging techniques were not an obstacle and as the behavior was tracked symbolically, the complete functionality of the program was captured in the generated twincode. The concepts used, e.g., trace and guided executions, were formally de ned and used to prove properties of the deobfuscation process. To evaluate their e ectiveness, several programs were protected with VO and then, used as test inputs. ETG graphs of the analyzed programs were drawn and compared with each other to see how much details of the original programs were restored after deobfuscation. A graph similarity measure was de ned for this purpose, which showed that the obtained ETGs after deobfuscation were considerably similar to the original CFGs and could distinguish test inputs with at least 18% margin. ETGs matched CFGs of the original programs, except for rearrangement of graph nodes, and were encoded as twincode in C language, which could be used for further analysis. To evaluate the performance of the deobfuscation process, the SPEC test programs were used. Analysis of complex programs such as gcc demonstrated that the additional overhead of twintool was in the order of 10 times, which was considerably lower than the additional overhead of Pin being in the order of 1000 times.
The presented deobfuscation framework can be used for di erent use cases, such as understanding the internal logic of a malware, e.g., DNG algorithm of a bot, which is impossible without deobfuscation; generation of comprehensive behavioral signatures for categorizing malware in related families; debugging the obfuscated benign software to examine correctness of the used obfuscation transformation; and analysis of close sourced and obfuscated software for the presence of possible backdoors. 
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